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We trace several trajectories—the evolution of field-based decision making models in the
mid-1980s to the formation of the Naturalistic Decision Making movement in 1989, then
the further broadening of NDM into Macrocognition in 2003, and finally the transition from
macrocognitive models into a set of methods and tools to boost cognitive performance.
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STAGE 1: NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING
During the 1980s, several researchers (Rasmussen, 1985; Cohen, 1986; Beach and Mitchell, 1987;
Klein, 1989; Noble, 1989) independently began investigating the nature of decision making in
work settings as opposed to laboratory, controlled settings. The NDM movement was catalyzed
by a program established by Judith Orasanu at the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences. Orasanu’s program funded several of the investigators and also brought them
together at periodic program reviews. A critical mass formed, leading to a 1989 workshop to
prepare a book describing the NDM perspective. Approximately 30 researchers were invited to
the meeting, including representatives from the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Navy was
particularly interested in the topic because the Vincennes shoot down had occurred just a year
earlier—an advanced AEGIS cruiser had shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, mistaking it
for an attacking F-14. The Navy was shortly to initiate its own program of naturalistic decision
research, Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS).
The 1989 workshop resulted in an edited book, Decision making in action: Models and methods
(Klein et al., 1993). The central NDM theme was to stud decision making under complex
conditions, with vague goals, organizational constraints, high stakes, and levels of experience not
easily captured in controlled laboratory settings (see Figure 1).
The term “Naturalistic Decision Making” was coined at the 1989 workshop, mirroring a related
emerging topic of interest in the psychology of learning, Naturalistic Memory, initiated by Ulric
Neisser. Naturalistic Memory encompassed topics of everyday memory, autobiographical memory,
and practical memory (Gruneberg et al., 1978; Neisser, 1982).
Yet Naturalistic Memory quickly faded, even though Neisser was an iconic figure whose 1967
book Cognitive Psychology had helped to establish a new discipline (Neisser, 1967). Why did this
happen? One possibility is that because Neisser was so famous, his suggestion of studying memory
under non-controlled conditions was seen as blasphemous. In 1989 the American Psychologist
devoted a special issue to allow critics to explain why Neisser’s project was misguided (e.g., Banaji
and Crowder, 1989—“The bankruptcy of everyday memory”). Laboratory researchers ridiculed the
notion that anything of use could be learned from studying memory in natural settings. It is jarring
to read their comments, aimed at one of the giants of the field, insisting that the new methodology
should not even be explored.
In contrast, NDM already had generated an important discovery. Klein et al. (1986) and Klein
(1989) described how people were able tomake decisions under time pressure and uncertainty—the
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. This finding parried any criticism that there was
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FIGURE 1 | NDM variables (Klein et al., 1993). Illustrated by David
Sweeney.
nothing to be learned from studying decision making in a natural
setting. The RPD model accounted for 80–90% of the decisions
that firefighters made. And the RPD model could never have
been discovered under laboratory conditions because the RPD
model depended on experience that took 10–20 years to develop.
Laboratory-based decision research gave college sophomores
unfamiliar tasks in order to avoid any contaminating effects
of prior experience that might add unwanted variability to the
results. Findings supporting the RPD model were replicated by
different research teams in different contexts: military leaders
(Schmitt and Klein, 1999), firefighters, (Keren et al., 2013), and
managers of offshore oil drilling platforms (Skriver, 1998). The
RPD model itself was tested and received empirical support
(Klein et al., 1995; Johnson and Raab, 2003).
Naturalistic Decision Making researchers study how people
actually make decisions. The word “actually,” may discomfort
laboratory researchers who can reasonably argue that even
college students performing unfamiliar tasks are “actually”
making decisions. However, many compromises have to be made
to perform controlled experiments. The restriction on context,
the absence of meaningful consequences, the use of tasks with
well-defined goals, and particularly the elimination of expertise
in studies presenting unfamiliar tasks, all raise doubts about
whether the findings of these studies can be generalized to natural
settings. Laboratory researchers can counter that the lack of
controlled conditions also raise doubts about the results of NDM
studies.We are not arguing that either tradition is the correct one.
We merely assert that NDM projects offer unique opportunities
for discoveries.
There was some criticism of NDM from laboratory-based
decision researchers. Lipshitz et al. (2001) published a lead
article in the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, and an
unprecedented number of researchers wrote commentaries, 16 in
all, centered around the theme that NDM needed to mature as a
discipline and establish more rigorous and controlled methods of
FIGURE 2 | Macrocognitive functions and processes.
investigation. The NDM community viewed these criticisms as
misguided. If NDM researchers followed the critics’ suggestions
and performed studies under controlled conditions, they would
no longer be doingNDMwork. The scientificmethod begins with
observing the phenomenon of interest, which is the core of NDM
research.
Unlike Naturalistic Memory, which quickly faded, NDM
thrived after the first NDMworkshop in 1989. Thus, far, a total of
12 NDM conferences have been held. A Cognitive Engineering
and Decision Making technical group, drawing on the NDM
community, was established in 1995 within the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society. This group now has its own Journal of
Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making.
STAGE 2: MACROCOGNITIVE MODELS
Because of the success of naturalistic inquiry into decision
making, NDM researchers quickly began applying this approach
to other cognitive phenomena, such as planning (e.g., Klein,
2007a,b), sensemaking (e.g., Klein et al., 2006), and uncertainty
management (e.g., Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997), as well as the
development of expertise itself (e.g., Klein, 1997). Figure 2
illustrates the range of cognitive functions and processes
addressed by macrocognitive models (Klein et al., 2003).
Klein et al. (2000) differentiated macrocognition and
microcognition. They defined macrocognition as the study of
cognitive processes affecting people such as firefighters, pilots,
nurses, and others who had to wrestle with difficult dilemmas
in complex settings under time pressure and uncertainty.
Microcognition was the study of the components of thinking
such as working memory, and serial vs. parallel attentional
processes. Other researchers had used the term macrocognition
(e.g., Cacciabue and Hollnagel, 1995) in papers, but had not
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identified it as a separate field of study, an expansion of the NDM
enterprise (for a fuller history, see Hoffman and McNeese, 2009).
The NDM community has now expanded its perspective
beyond decision making, to cover the variety of macrocognitive
models and to perform naturalistic studies of cognitive processes
and variables. Sometimes, macrocognitive studies are performed
under controlled conditions and the studies often involve the
control and manipulation of variables. But the core of the
work examines cognitive processes in complex contexts—in the
context of the work environment. Macrocognitive studies usually
address expertise, how it develops, what constitutes it, how it is
used to perform challenging tasks. Sometimes researchers will
investigate novices, to see how they differ from experts, how they
approach tasks, and where they struggle.
The criticisms of NDM that have been raised by laboratory
scientists also will apply to macrocognition. It is less concerned
with testing hypotheses than with formulating useful models
and theories. It is less concerned with precision than with
plausibility. It is less concerned with normative or “rational”
models than with descriptive models. It wallows in messy
variables such as wicked problems with ill-defined goals, team
and organizational constraints, uncertainty, and high stakes. It
studies tasks for which there are no correct solutions, making it
difficult to evaluate performance. Guilty as charged. These are
the conditions in which we live and work, and macrocognitive
research attempts to better understand them. Figure 1, a diagram
originally formulated for NDM equally well illustrates the
variables of interest for macrocognition.
Klein (2015) described the impact of the
NDM/macrocognitive perspective, by cataloging the way
this perspective has changed so many core beliefs previously held
in the basic and applied communities.
We no longer claim that the only way to make a good decision
is to generate several options and compare them to pick the
best one (experienced decision-makers can draw on patterns to
handle time pressure and never even compare options; Klein,
1989; Hoffman, 1992). We no longer believe that expertise is
based on learning rules and procedures (it primarily depends
on tacit knowledge, Klein and Hoffman, 1993). We no longer
believe that projects must start with a clear description of the goal
(many projects involve wicked problems and ill- defined goals,
Hoffman, 2007). We no longer believe that people make sense of
events by building up from data to information to knowledge to
understanding (experienced personnel use their mental models
to define what counts as data in the first place, Skriver et al.,
2004; Schraagen et al., 2008). We no longer believe that insights
arise by overcoming mental sets (they also arise by detecting
contradictions and anomalies and by noticing connections, Klein,
2013). We no longer believe that we can reduce uncertainty by
gathering more information (performance seems to go down
when too much information is gathered—Uncertainty can stem
from inadequate framing of data, not just from the absence of
data, Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Omodei et al., 2005; Flin et al.,
2008; Grossman et al., 2014). We no longer believe that we can
improve performance by teaching critical thinking precepts such
as listing assumptions (too often the flawed assumptions are ones
we are not even aware of and would never list, Klein, 2011;
Stanton et al., 2011; Hoffman et al., 2014).
Whereas the behavioral decision making community focuses on
human limitations and seeks ways to reduce biases and mistakes,
the NDM community, as it performs macrocognitive research,
focuses on human capabilities and regards good performance as
much more than the absence of mistakes. Good performance is
also about discoveries and insights; it is about the strengths of
decision makers, and the importance of experience. Experience
serves a variety of functions including a larger repertoire of
patterns and associated actions, a richer mental model of how
things work to support inferential reasoning and sensemaking for
diagnosis and anticipation.
STAGE 3: MACROCOGNITIVE METHODS
AND TOOLS
Macrocognitive models lend themselves to a set of methods and
tools that can be used in cognitively challenging activities. This
third stage is about compiling a toolbox, not to do research, but
to enhance performance.
A recent study illustrates how a macrocognitive perspective
provides a unique diagnosis of a problem, not by blaming those
committing the error (those on the sharp end, as James (Reason,
1990), would put it), but by investigating how conscientious
employees could be making poor decisions (Multer et al., 2015;
Safar et al., 2015). The problem was railroad crashes caused by
locomotive engineers who failed to stop despite clear signals
warning them of danger. It seemed obvious that the locomotive
engineers were getting distracted or were failing to pay adequate
attention. Strategies were devised to help the engineers, including
a “Keep the Focus” program. However, Multer et al. (2015)
viewed the inattention/distraction issue as a symptom of the
problem, not as the source of the problem. They investigated
the reasons for the inattentiveness, using interviews and field
observations. They examined the sociotechnical context of the
“Signals Passed at Danger” phenomenon. One finding was that
each signal had several lights, including a red light, but the red
light was always on! Thus, the red light provided no information.
The other lights signaled whether to stop or proceed with caution.
Another finding was that central stations had outgrown their
original design because railway traffic had increased. Space
became more cramped, the switching arrangements had become
more complex, and the viewing angles became more ambiguous
as different signals were moved closer and closer, to the point
that the engineers were not always sure which signal pertained
to which line. Worse, because trains were now longer, signals
were sometimes placed behind the train and out of sight of the
engineers in the locomotive cab.
Holtrop et al. (2015) used Cognitive Task Analysis in
the domain of healthcare. They were sending healthcare
practitioners—nurses, aides, etc.—into the community to work
with patients who had chronic illnesses such as cardiac disease
and diabetes. But the effort was running into barriers because
each clinic and practice had its own decision making style. So
the project added a Cognitive Task Analysis training piece, a two-
day workshop to train the outreach personnel in CTA methods
in order to overcome the differences in decision making. The
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training was highly successful, and the recommendations gained
greater acceptance. Accordinatly, the healthcare practitioners
became advocates for front-end CTA analysis prior to initiating
any new effort.
Many domains depend on training to get employees up to
speed, but the training usually centers on rules and procedures.
What is missing is a concern for the tough decisions employees
will have to make once they complete their training: the difficult
sensemaking they will face when confronted with ambiguous
cues and erroneous data, the challenging problem detection when
things are just starting to go wrong. The field of macrocognition
is well suited for addressing cognitive training requirements.
Hoffman et al. (2014) provided an important resource—a
compilation of best practices for accelerating the development
of expertise. They identified strategies for practice and feedback,
transfer, and retention, and also addressed team training issues.
Expertise is central to all the macrocognitive processes. Tactics
for speeding up expertise are essential macrocognitive tools.
The design of new systems, and the modification of existing
systems, can benefit greatly from a macrocognitive perspective,
and a variety of methods have emerged for injecting cognition
into the design process (e.g., Militello and Hutton, 1998; Militello
et al., 2010; Militello and Klein, 2013) and for making automation
a team player (Klein et al., 2004). The intent here is to develop
macrocognitive work systems.
One last example of a macrocognitive tool is the ShadowBox
approach. ShadowBox R© training is a scenario-based way to
enable trainees to see the world through the eyes of experts
without the experts having to be present. One of the bottlenecks
of expert feedback is that there is a limited number of
experts and their time is jealously guarded. ShadowBox presents
challenging scenarios and intersperses decision points at which
the participant is asked to rank a given set of options. These may
be options about which course of action to choose, which goal
to prioritize, which cues to monitor carefully, or which pieces of
information to gather. A participant ranks the options and writes
his/her rationale for the rankings. In preparation for the training
session, a panel of subject-matter experts also has rank ordered
the options and provided their rationale statements. At this
point, the experts are no longer needed. The expert rankings are
combined, and the rationale statements are synthesized. Once the
participant provides rankings and rationale, he/she sees what the
panel of experts ranked, and sees the experts’ rationale, noticing
what he/she had missed. In this way, the participant gets to see
the scenario through the eyes of the experts, and gets a sense of
the experts’ mental models.
Hintze (2008), a Battalion Chief with the New York Fire
Department originated the ShadowBox concept. Klein et al.
(2013) elaborated on the ShadowBox concept. While it is
primarily a means of providing cognitive training, it also can be
used as a knowledge management tool to capture the wisdom of
experts in the form of the rankings and reasons they provide. A
third use of ShadowBox is for assessment, using a participant’s
rankings and rationale to evaluate competence. And a fourth use
is for better teamwork. Here, team members identify how they
would react at critical moments in a scenario, and they predict
how their partners would react. Then each partner sees what the
other would do, and what the other expected. In this way, teams
can get better at predicting what the others will do; predictability
is essential to team coordination. A fifth use of ShadowBox is to
support leadership. For a given scenario, the leader or supervisor
acts in the place of the panel of experts, and gets to see how the
subordinates would act, and what their reasoning was; the idea is
to strengthen the calibration of the leader and the subordinates.
The subordinates don’t have to agree with the supervisor, but they
do have to understand what the supervisor expects and how the
supervisor interprets the situation.
CONCLUSION
The NDM framework has developed over the past 30 years,
shaping the thinking and capabilities of a community of
researchers and practitioners. The NDM community is now
engaged in studying macrocognitive phenomena and developing
methods for supporting these functions and processes. This
work has shaped our thinking about cognitive processes such
as decision making, sensemaking, and problem detection that
are engaged in complex and uncertain environments. It has
shaped our capabilities for training, decision support systems,
and system design. NDM researchers typically work with
domain specialists performing complex and challenging tasks.
Accordingly, the methods and the models are especially suited
to applications and are grounded in the variables that matter the
most in “natural” conditions.
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